Theft in the Singular and in the Plural
Moral decisions have to involve the realization of what our actions cause collectively and individually. ACHAREI-KEDOSHIM ACHAREI-KEDOSHIM
Two Forms of Theft
Among the plethora of commandments in this week’s parsha we find the commandment not to steal. Our Sages tell us that this commandment is not a repetition of the one that was stated in the Ten Commandments. There it refers to the prohibition against kidnapping, whereas in our parsha it refers to theft of property.
When we compare the way the Torah presents these two forms of theft it is clear that they are different in yet another way. The commandment not to steal in that appears in the Ten Commandments is written in the singular form “Lo Tignov.” By contrast, the commandment in this week’s parsha— which is directed against the theft of property—is presented in the plural form: “Lo Tignovu.” Since every detail of the Torah is precise there must be a reason why the Torah changes the tenses. Moreover, there must be a reason why kidnapping is stated in ACHAREI-KEDOSHIM the singular form whereas theft of money is stated in the plural.
One simple way of explaining the change from singular to plural lies in the qualitatively different nature of these two crimes. Frequently, we hear of people who attempt to justify financial crimes such as petty larceny, or at least find some rationalization as to why it is not so serious.
Stealing One Apple?
To illustrate: A poor person might feel the justification to steal one apple from a major supermarket with the rationalization that it won’t cause anyone any real harm. The billionaire owners of the supermarket will never miss that lone apple. It will have zero impact on their bottom line. In his mind there are no real victims. So why should he, the impoverished individual, not benefit from others’ wealth, much of which will go to waste anyhow.
On the other hand, one would be hard pressed to find a rational person who might try to rationalize kidnapping or murdering another with this rationale. Even a gravely ill person will not justify killing another to obtain an organ for transplantation. One would find it much more ACHAREI-KEDOSHIM difficult to legitimize stealing a child from his or her parents than it would be to steal money or any other ephemeral benefit.
How do we refute the abovementioned rationalization of the would-be thief or those within society that find some justification for the crime of theft?
Obviously, the ultimate repudiation of theft is the Torah’s proscribing it. But, with regard to the rational laws known as Mishpatim, the Torah wants us to understand these laws and not just accept them on faith. These commandments are singled out to be included in the category of rational commandments because G-d wants us to not just follow them but that they should resonate within us. In Maimonides’ words, a person who desists from committing a crime because he is repulsed by it is superior to the one who is tempted to do it but only desists because it is against the law.
The Rational Argument
What then is the rational argument against petty theft?
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The argument is that if something that is right for one person to do it would also have to be right for two or more people to do. In fact, if it’s acceptable for one person to commit petty larceny then it should be acceptable for everyone to do the same. Now if that would indeed occur—that everyone would take advantage of the rational argument that justifies stealing one apple—all the apples of the world that are for sale would be pilfered. And why stop at apples? In short, it would cause the collapse of the world’s economy and would ultimately lead to anarchy, mass starvation, wars and all other undesirable consequences.
To underscore this point the Torah speaks of theft in the plural to alert the potential thief—and his supporters—of the consequences of this crime when it si in the plural. This enables these individuals to realize the obvious that if many people pilfer it would be disastrous for all. Thus it is forbidden for anyone to commit that crime. To think about the crime in the plural helps us recognize the fallacy of the thought process that minimizes the severity of the crime.
With respect to the capital crime of kidnapping—as with respect to murder—the Torah has no need to speak in terms of mass murder or kidnapping to ACHAREI-KEDOSHIM make the potential criminal desist. Even the singular violation of these heinous crimes ought to be quite repulsive to most sane individuals. For the psychopath who is not deterred from committing this crime, putting it in the plural will not be any more convincing. Hence the Torah prefers to state these commandments in the singular to underscore the seriousness of the crime even when it affects the commission of the crime by one person. And this conclusion is just as logical and true even if there would be a guarantee that it would not affect another individual.
Two Approaches to the Performance of One Mitzvah
From the above analysis we may glean that there are two ways to view every Mitzvah that we have the ability to perform.
There are times when we must reflect on the aggregate effect of our good deeds. Perhaps, we may argue rationally, that doing one more Mitzvah is not going to change the world. How can one insignificant act of one insignificant person bring Moshiach?
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The response to this question is twofold:
First, when we perform a Mitzvah we must view its performance as being one that Jews from all over the world are also performing. To desist from the Mitzvah because one person’s contribution has little value can be compared to the story of the wine maker who poured water into the communal wine barrel thinking that one cup of water will not adulterate the barrel full of wine. The problem is that all of the wine makers thought alike… To desist from doing a Mitzvah that we have the opportunity to perform is a form of theft. We are stealing the opportunity to bring the world a step closer to the final Redemption when all of the ills of the world will be rectified. To delay that process by not performing a Mitzvah may be considered petty larceny when only one person thinks that way, but it deals a catastrophic blow to the world if everyone thinks this way.
The second argument is that, in fact, there is no such thing as an insignificant Mitzvah. In truth, each and every Mitzvah—which is an expression of G-d’s will—has cosmic and infinite G-dly power. Furthermore, that one Mitzvah can be the proverbial straw that will break the back of Galut/exile and ACHAREI-KEDOSHIM usher in the Redemption. Failure to do one Mitzvah is to perform the act of kidnapping because every Mitzvah places us in G-d’s domain. Failure to do that Mitzvah “kidnaps” us and transfers us into the un-G-dly domain referred to in Kabbalah as the “Sitra Achara-the Other Side,” and is the spiritual equivalent of stealing a person and selling him or her.
Our mission in these last moment of exile is thus to think in terms of our individual efforts being simultaneously part of a universal thrust to bring Moshiach and Redemption, as well as having the explosive power of many megatons of spiritual nuclear energy. Combined, they will surely hasten the process of the Redemption and make the world receptive to the changes that will occur in this process.
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From the book Light from the Future: Parshas Acharei-Kedoshim by Rabbi Heschel Greenberg, published by the Jewish Discovery Center.
